We study trade-offs between accuracy and privacy in the context of linear queries over histograms. This is a rich class of queries that includes contingency tables and range queries and has been the focus of a long line of work. For a given set of d linear queries over a database x ∈ R N , we seek to find the differentially private mechanism that has the minimum mean squared error. For pure differential privacy, [5, 32] give an O(log 2 d) approximation to the optimal mechanism. Our first contribution is to give an efficient O(log 2 d) approximation guarantee for the case of (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Our mechanism adds carefully chosen correlated Gaussian noise to the answers. We prove its approximation guarantee relative to the hereditary discrepancy lower bound of [44], using tools from convex geometry.
INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [18] is a privacy definition that has become the standard notion of privacy in statistical databases. Informally, a mechanism (a randomized function on databases) satisfies differential privacy if the distribution of the outcome of the mechanism does not change noticeably when one individual's input to the database is changed. Privacy is measured by how small this change must be: an ε-differentially private (ε-DP) mechanism M satisfies Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(x ) ∈ S] for any pair x, x of databases differing in one individual's input, and for any measurable subset S of the range. A relaxation of this definition is approximate differential privacy. A mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially private ((ε, δ)-DP) if Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(x ) ∈ S] + δ with x, x , S as before.
In recent years, a large body of research has shown that this strong privacy definition still allows for very accurate analysis of statistical databases. At the same time, answering a large number of adversarially chosen queries accurately is inherently impossible with any semblance of privacy. Indeed Dinur and Nissim [15] show that answeringÕ(d) random subset sums (Õ hides polylogarithmic factors in N, d, 1/δ) of a set of d bits with (per query) error o( √ d) allows an attacker to reconstruct (an arbitrarily good approximation to) all the private information. Thus there is an inherent trade-off between privacy and accuracy when answering a large number of queries. In this work, we study this trade-off in the context of linear queries and the special case of counting queries.
We think of the database as being given by a multiset of database rows, one for each individual. We will let N denote the size of the universe that these rows come from, and we will denote by n the number of individuals in the database. We can represent the database as its histogram x ∈ R N with xi denoting the number of occurrences of the ith element of the universe. Thus x would in fact be a vector of non-negative integers with x 1 = n. We will be concerned with reporting reasonably accurate answers to a given set of d linear queries over this histogram x. This set of queries can naturally be represented by a matrix A ∈ R d×N with the vector Ax ∈ R d giving the correct answers to the queries. When A ∈ {0, 1} d×N , we call such queries counting queries. We are interested in the (practical) regime where N d n, although our results hold for all settings of the parameters.
A differentially private mechanism will return a noisy answer to the query A and, in this work, unless otherwise stated, we measure the accuracy of the mechanisms in terms of its worst case total expected squared error. Suppose that X ⊆ R N is the set of all possible databases. The error of a mechanism M is defined as
Here the expectation is taken over the internal coin tosses of the mechanism, and we look at the worst case of this expected squared error over all the databases in X. Phrased thus, the Gaussian noise mechanism of Dwork et al. [16] gives error at most O(d 2 ) for any counting query and guarantees (ε, δ)-DP 1 over all the databases, i.e. X = R N . Moreover, the aforementioned lower bounds imply that there exist counting queries for which this bound can not be improved. For ε-DP, Hardt and Talwar [32] gave a mechanism with error O(d 2 log
N d
) and showed that this is the best possible for random counting queries. Thus the worst case accuracy for counting queries is fairly well-understood in this measure.
Specific sets of counting queries of interest can however admit much better mechanisms than adversarially chosen queries for which the lower bounds are shown. Indeed several classes of specific queries have attracted attention. Some, such as range queries, are "easier", and asymptotically better mechanisms can be designed for them. Others, such as constant dimensional contingency tables, are nearly as hard as general counting queries, and asymptotically better mechanisms can be ruled out in some ranges of the parameters. These query-specific upper bounds are usually proved by carefully exploiting the structure of the queries [13, 15, 19, 22, 35, 36] . It is natural to address this question in a competitive analysis framework: can we design an efficient algorithm that given any query A, computes (even approximately) the differentially private mechanism for A with minimum error?
Hardt and Talwar [32] answered this question in the affirmative for ε-DP mechanisms, and gave a mechanism that has error within factor O(log 3 d) of the optimal assuming the hyperplane conjecture from convex geometry. Bhaskara et al. [5] removed the dependence on the hyperplane conjecture and improved the approximation ratio to O(log 2 d). Can relaxing the privacy requirement to (ε, δ)-DP help with accuracy? In many settings, (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms can be simpler and more accurate than the best known ε-DP mechanisms. This motivates the first question we address.
Question 1 Given A, can we efficiently approximate the optimal error (ε, δ)-DP mechanism for it?
Hardt and Talwar [32] showed that for some A, the lower bound for ε-DP mechanism can be Ω(log N ) larger than known (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms. For non-linear Lipschitz queries, De [13] showed that this gap can be as large as Ω( √ d) (even when N = d). This leads us to ask: Question 2 How large can the gap between the optimal ε-DP mechanism and the optimal (ε, δ)-DP mechanism be for linear queries?
When the databases are sparse, e.g. when x 1 ≤ n d, one may obtain better mechanisms. Blum, Ligett and Roth [7] gave an ε-DP mechanism that can answer any set of d counting queries with 1 Here and in the rest of the introduction, we suppress the dependence of the error on ε and δ. errorÕ(dn 4 3 ). A series of subsequent works [20, 21, 27, 28, 30, 31, 49] led to (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms that have error onlyÕ(dn). Thus when n < d, the lower bound of O(d 2 ) for arbitrary databases can be breached by exploiting the sparsity of the database. This motivates a more refined measure of error that takes the sparsity of A into account. Given an A and n, one can ask for the mechanism M that minimizes the sparse case error max x:
The next set of questions we study address this measure. Question 3 Given A and n, can we approximate the optimal sparse case error (ε, δ)-DP mechanism for A when restricted to databases of size at most n? Question 4 Given A and n, can we approximate the optimal sparse case error ε-DP mechanism for A when restricted to databases of size at most n?
The gap between theÕ(dn 3 ) error ε-DP mechanism of [7] and theÕ(dn) error (ε, δ)-DP mechanism of [31] leads us to ask:
Question 5
Is there an ε-DP mechanism with errorÕ(dn) for databases of size at most n?
Results
In this work, we answer Questions 1-5 above. Denote by B
In this paper, we are interested in both the case when X = R N , called the dense case, and when X = nB
, where errM is defined in (1). Our first result is a simple and efficient mechanism that for query matrix A gives an O(log 2 d) approximation to the optimal error.
Theorem 1 Given a query matrix
there is an efficient (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M and an efficiently computable lower bound LA such that
We also show that the gap of Ω(log(N/d)) between ε-DP and (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms shown in [32] is essentially the worst possible, within polylog(d) factor, for linear queries. More precisely, the lower bound on ε-DP mechanisms used in [32] is always within O(log(N/d) polylog(d)) of the lower bound LA computed by our algorithm above. Let M * denote the ε-DP generalized K-norm mechanism in [32] .
Theorem 2 For any
We next move to the sparse case. Here we give results analogous to the dense case with a slightly worse approximation ratio.
Theorem 3 Given A ∈ R
d×N and a bound n, there is an efficient (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M and an efficiently computable lower bound LA,n such that
Theorem 4 Given A ∈ R
d×N and a bound n, there is an efficient ε-DP mechanism M and an efficiently computable lower bound LA,n such that
We remark that in these theorems, our upper bounds hold for all x with x 1 ≤ n, whereas the lower bounds hold even when x is an integer vector.
The (ε, δ)-DP mechanism of Theorem 3 when run on any counting query has error no larger than the best known bounds [28] for counting queries, up to constants (not ignoring logarithmic factors). The ε-DP mechanism of Theorem 4 when run on any counting query can be shown to have nearly the same asymptotic bound., answering question 5 in the affirmative.
Theorem 5 For any counting query
We will summarize some key ideas we use to achieve these results. More details will follow in Section 1.2.
For the upper bounds, the first crucial step is to decompose A into "geometrically nice" components and then add Gaussian noise to each component. This is similar to the approach in [5, 32] but we use the minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid, rather than the M -ellipsoid used in those works, to facilitate the decomposition process. This allows us to handle the approximate and the sparse cases. In addition, it simplifies the mechanism as well as the analysis. For the sparse case, we further couple the mechanism with least squares estimation of the noisy answer with respect to nAB N 1 . By utilizing techniques from statistical estimation, we can show that this post-processing step can reduce the error when n < d, and prove an error upper bound dependent on the size of the smallest projection of nAB
For the lower bounds, we first lower bound the accuracy of any ( , δ)-DP mechanism by the hereditary discrepancy of the query matrix A, which we in turn lower bound in terms of the least singular values of submatrices of A. Finally, we close the loop by utilizing the restricted invertibility principle by Bourgain and Tzafriri [8] and its extension by Vershynin [50] which, informally, shows that if there does not exist a "small" projection of nAB N 1 then A has a "large" submatrix with a "large" least singular value.
Approximating Hereditary Discrepancy
The discrepancy disc(A) of a matrix A ∈ R d×N is defined to be min x∈{−1,+1} N Ax ∞. The hereditary discrepancy of a matrix is defined as herdisc(A) = max S⊆ [N] disc(A|S), where A|S denotes the matrix A restricted to the columns indexed by S.
As hereditary discrepancy is a maximum over exponentially many submatrices, it is not a priori clear if there even exists a polynomialtime verifiable certificate for low hereditary discrepancy. Additionally, we can show that it is NP-hard to approximate hereditary discrepancy to within a factor of 3/2. Bansal [1] gave an efficient algorithm for computing a vector x ∈ {−1, 1} N such that Ax ∞ is at most a factor of O(log dN ) larger than herdisc(A) for a d × N matrix A. His algorithm allows efficiently computing a lower bound on herdisc; however, such a lower bound may be arbitrarily loose, and before our work it was not known how to efficiently compute nearly matching lower and upper bounds on herdisc.
Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [44] show that for a query matrix A ∈ R d×N , the error of any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism is lower bounded by (an 2 (up to logarithmic factors). Moreover, the lower bound used in Theorem 1 is in fact a lower bound on this version of herdisc(A). Using the von Neumann minimax theorem, we can go between the 2 2 and the ∞ versions of these concepts, allowing us to sandwich the hereditary discrepancy of A between two quantities: a spectral lower bound and the efficiently computable expected error of the private mechanism. As the two quantities are nearly matching, our work therefore leads to a polylogarithmic approximation to the hereditary discrepancy of any matrix A, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Approximating Hereditary Discrepancy) There is a polynomial time algorithm that give a d×N real matrix
Due to space limit, we will only describe the tools we use and the proof details for Theorem 1 and 3. We refer to the full version [45] for the details of the other results.
Techniques
In addition to known techniques from the differential privacy literature, our work borrows tools from discrepancy theory, convex geometry and statistical estimation. We next briefly describe how they fit in.
Central to designing a provably good approximation algorithm is an efficiently computable lower bound on the optimum. Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [44] proved that (a slight variant of) the hereditary discrepancy of A leads to a lower bound for the error of any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism. Lovász, Spencer and Vesztergombi [41] showed that hereditary discrepancy itself can be lower bounded by a quantity called the determinant lower bound. Geometrically, this lower bound corresponds to picking the d columns of A that (along with the origin) give us a simplex with the largest possible volume. The volume of this simplex, appropriately normalized, gives us a lower bound on the minimum error of any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism. More precisely for any simplex S, d
3 · vol(S)
gives a lower bound on the error. The log −2 d factor can be removed by using a lower bound based on the least singular values of submatrices of A.
If the N columns of A all lie in a unit ball of radius R, it can be shown that adding Gaussian noise proportional to R suffices to guarantee (ε, δ)-DP, resulting in a mechanism having total squared error dR 2 . Can we relate this quantity to the lower bound? It turns out that if the unit ball of radius R is the minimum volume ellipsoid containing the columns of A, this can be done. In this case, a result of Vershynin [50] , building on the restricted invertibility results by Bourgain and Tzafriri [8] , tells us that one can find Ω(d) vertices of K that touch the minimum containing ellipsoid, and are nearly orthogonal. The simplex formed by these vertices therefore has large volume, giving us a (ε, δ)-DP lower bound of Ω(dR 2 ). In this case, the Gaussian mechanism with the optimal R is within a constant factor of the lower bound. When the minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid is not a ball, we need to project the query along the d 2 shortest axes of this ellipsoid, answer this projection using the Gaussian mechanism, and ecu's on the orthogonal projection. Using the full power of the restricted invertibility result by Vershynin allows us to construct a large simplex and prove our competitive ratio.
Hardt and Talwar [32] also used a volume based lower bound, but for ε-DP mechanisms, one can take K, the symmetric convex hull of all the columns of A and use its volume instead of the volume of S in the lower bound above. How do these lower bounds compare? By a result of Bárány and Füredi [3] and Gluskin [26] , one can show that the volume of the convex hull of N points can be bounded by
times that of the minimum enclosing ellipsoid. This, along with the aforementioned restricted invertibility results, allows us to prove that the ε-DP lower bound is within
How do we handle sparse queries? The first observation is that the lower bounding technique gives us d columns of A and the resulting lower bound holds not just for A but even for the d × d submatrix of A corresponding to the maximum volume simplex S; moreover, the lower bound holds even when all databases are restricted to O(d) individuals. Thus the lower bound holds when n = O(d) and this value marks the transition between the sparse and the dense cases. Moreover, when the minimum volume ellipsoid containing the columns of A is a ball, the restricted invertibility principle of Bourgain and Tzafriri and Vershynin gives us a d-dimensional simplex whose vertices form a nearly orthogonal basis, and, therefore any n-dimensional face of this simplex is another simplex of large volume. The large n-dimensional simplex gives a lower bound on error when databases are restricted to have at most n individuals.
For smaller n, the error added by the Gaussian mechanism may be too large, and even though the value Ax lies in nAB N 1 , the noisy answer will likely fall outside this set. A common technique in statistical estimation for handling such error is to "project" the noisy point back into nAB N 1 , i.e. report the pointŷ in nAB N 1 that minimizes the Euclidean distance to the noisy answerỹ. This projection step provably reduces the expected error! Geometrically, we use well known techniques from statistics to show that the error after projection is bounded in terms of the width of nAB N 1 in the direction of the noise vector; the width is much smaller on average than the length of the noise vector when n = o(d). In fact, when the noise is a spherical Gaussian, it can be shown that ŷ − y 2 2 is only about
2 . This gives near optimal bounds for the case when the minimum volume ellipsoid is a ball; the general case is handled using a recursive mechanism as before.
To get an ε-DP mechanism, we use the K-norm mechanism [32] instead of Gaussian noise. To bound the width of nAB N 1 in the direction of w, where w is the noise vector generated by the K-norm mechanism, we first analyze the expectation of ai, w for any column of A, and we use the log concavity of the noise distribution to prove concentration of this random variable. A union bound helps complete the argument as in the Gaussian case.
Related Work
Dwork et al. [18] showed that any query can be released while adding noise proportional to the total sensitivity of the query. This motivated the question of designing mechanisms with good guarantees for any set of low sensitivity queries. Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [46] showed that adding noise proportional to (a smoothed version of) the local sensitivity of the query suffices for guaranteeing differential privacy; this may be much smaller than the worst case sensitivity for non-linear queries. Lower bounds on the amount of noise needed for general low sensitivity queries have been shown in [13, 15, 18, 19, 22, 32, 48] . Kasiviswathan et al. [36] showed upper and lower bounds for contingency table queries and more recently [35] showed lower bounds on publishing error rates of classifiers or even M-estimators. Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [44] showed that combinatorial discrepancy lower bounds the noise for answering any set of linear queries.
Using learning theoretic techniques, Blum, Ligett and Roth [7] first showed that one can exploit sparsity of the database, and answer a large number of counting queries with error small compared to the number of individuals in the database. This line of work has been further extended and improved in terms of error bounds, efficiency, generality and interactivity in several subsequent works [20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 49] .
Ghosh, Roughgarden and Sundarajan [25] showed that for any one dimensional counting query, a discrete version of the Laplacian mechanism is optimal for pure privacy in a very general utilitarian framework and Gupte and Sundararajan [29] extended this to risk averse agents. Brenner and Nissim [9] showed that such universally optimal private mechanisms do not exist for two counting queries or for a single non-binary sum query. As mentioned above, Hardt and Talwar [32] , and Bhaskara et al. [5] gave relative guarantees for multi-dimensional queries under pure privacy with respect to total squared error. De [13] unified and strengthened these bounds and showed stronger lower bounds for the class of non-linear low sensitivity queries.
For specific queries of interest, improved upper bounds are known. Barak et al. [2] studied low dimensional marginals and showed that by running the Laplace mechanism on a different set of queries, one can reduce error. Using a similar strategy, improved mechanisms were given by [10, 51] for orthogonal counting queries, and near optimal mechanisms were given by Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [44] for halfspace counting queries. The approach of answering a set of queries different from the target query set has also been studied in more generality and for other sets of queries by [14, 38, 48, [51] [52] [53] . Li and Miklau [39, 40] study a class of mechanisms called extended matrix mechanisms and show that one can efficiently find the best mechanisms from this class. Hay et al. [33] show that in certain settings such as unattributed histograms, correcting noisy answers to enforce a consistency constraint can improve accuracy.
Very recently, Fawaz et al. [23] used the hereditary discrepancy lower bounds of Muthukrishnan and Nikolov, as well as the determinant lower bound on discrepancy of Lovasz, Spencer, and Vesztergombi, to prove that a certain Gaussian noise mechanism is nearly optimal (in the dense setting) for computing any given convolution map. Like our algorithms, their algorithm adds correlated Gaussian noise; however, they always use the Fourier basis to correlate the noise.
We refer the reader to texts by Chazelle [12] and Matoušek [42] and the chapter by Beck and Sós [4] for an introduction to discrepancy theory. Bansal [1] showed that a semidefinite relaxation can be used to design a pseudo-approximation algorithm for hereditary discrepancy. Matoušek [43] showed that the determinant based lower bound of Lovász, Spencer and Vesztergombi [41] is tight up to polylogarithmic factors. Larsen [37] showed applications of hereditary discrepancy to data structure lower bounds, and Chandrasekaran and Vempala [11] recently showed applications of hereditary discrepancy to problems in integer programming.
PRELIMINARIES
We start by introducing some basic notations. Let B 
Geometry
Often we use instead the volume radius 
Statistical Estimation
A key element in our algorithms for the sparse case is the use of least squares estimation to reduce error. Below we present a bound on the error of least squares estimation with respect to symmetric convex bodies. This analysis appears to be standard in the statistics literature; a special case of it appears for example in [47] .
Lemma 1 Let L ⊆ R
d be a symmetric convex body, and let y ∈ L andỹ = y + w for some w ∈ R d . Let, finally,
We have ŷ − y
First we show the easier bound ŷ − y 2 ≤ 2 w 2 , which follows by the triangle inequality:
The second bound is based on Hölder's inequality and the following simple but very useful fact, illustrated schematically in Figure 1: 
Inequality (2), w =ỹ − y, and Hölder's inequality imply
which completes the proof.
Differential Privacy
As in the introduction, we define a database D as a multiset of n elements of a universe U of size N . Our algorithms take as input a histogram of D, as defined in the introduction.
Through most of this paper, we work under the notion of approximate differential privacy. The definition follows.
Definition 1 ( [17, 18]) A (randomized) algorithm M with input domain R N and output range Y is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every x, x with x − x 1 ≤ 1, and every measurable S ⊆ Y , M satisfies
When δ = 0, we are in the regime of pure differential privacy. An important basic property of differential privacy is that the privacy guarantees degrade smoothly under composition and are not affected by post-processing.
Lemma 2 ( [17, 18]) Let M1 and M2 satisfy (ε1, δ1)-and (ε2, δ2)-differential privacy, respectively. Then the algorithm which on input x outputs the tuple (M1(x), M2(M1(x), x)) satisfies
(ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-differential privacy.
Optimality for Linear Queries
In this paper we study the necessary and sufficient error incurred by differentially private algorithms for approximating linear queries. A set of d linear queries is given by a d × N query matrix or workload A; the exact answers to the queries on a histogram x are given by the d-dimensional vector y = Ax.
We define error as total squared error. More precisely, for an algorithm M and a subset X ⊆ R N , we define
We also write errM(A, nB N 1 ) as errM(A, n). The optimal error achievable by any (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm for queries A and databases of size up to n is
where the infimum is taken over all (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms. When no restrictions are placed on the size n of the database, the appropriate notion of optimal error is opt ε,δ (A) sup n opt ε,δ (A, n). Similarly, for an algorithm M, the error when database size is not bounded is errM(A) sup n errM(A, n). A priori it is not clear that these quantities are necessarily finite, but we will show that this is the case.
In order to get tight dependence on the privacy parameter ε in our analysis, we will use the following relationship between opt ε,δ (A, n) and opt ε ,δ (A, n).
Lemma 3
For any ε, any δ < 1, any integer k and for δ ≥
We defer the proof to the appendix. Above, we state the error and optimal error definitions for histograms x, which can be arbitrary real vectors. All our algorithms work in this general setting. Recall, however, that the histograms arising from our definition of databases are integer vectors. Our lower bounds do hold against integer histograms as well. Therefore, defining err and opt in terms of integer histograms (i.e. taking errM(A, n) errM(A, nB
does not change the asymptotics of our theorems.
Gaussian Noise Mechanism
A basic mechanism for achieving (ε, δ)-differential privacy for linear queries is adding appropriately scaled independent Gaussian noise to each query [6] . Next we define this basic mechanism formally and give a privacy guarantee. The privacy analysis of the Gaussian mechanism in the context of (ε, δ)-differential privacy was first given in [17] . The full proof is included in the appendix for completeness.
Lemma 4 Let
The following corollary is a useful geometric generalization of Lemma 4.
Corollary 9 Let
A = (ai) N i=1 be a d × N matrix of rank d and let K = sym{a1, . . . , aN }. Let E = F B d
(F is a linear map) be an ellipsoid containing K. Then a mechanism that outputs
We present a composition theorem, specific to composing Gaussian noise mechanisms. We note that a similar composition result in a much more general setting but with slightly inferior dependence on the parameters is proven in [21] . 
Then the mechanism that outputs Ax
+ √ k k i=1 Fiwi where for each i, wi ∼ N (0, 1+ √ 2 ln(1/δ) ε ) d i , satisfies (ε, δ)-differential pri- vacy.
Noise Lower Bounds
We will make extensive use of a lower bound on the noise complexity of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms in terms of combinatorial discrepancy. First we need to define the notion of hereditary α-discrepancy:
We denote herdisc(A) maxn herdisc1(A, n). An equivalent notation is herdisc 2 (A). When the 2 norm is substituted with ∞, we have the classical notion hereditary discrepancy, here denoted herdisc ∞ (A). Next we present the lower bound, which is a simple extension of the discrepancy lower bound on noise recently proved by Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [44] . 
Theorem 11 ( [44]) Let
We further develop a lower bound for herdiscα(A, n) which are more convenient to work with by using spectral techniques. Observe first that, since the 2-norm of any vector does not increase under projection, we have herdiscα(A, n) ≥ herdiscα(ΠA, n) for any projection matrix Π. Furthermore, recall that for a matrix
Let's define
Substituting (3) into Theorem 11, we have that there exist constants c1 and c2 such that
For the remainder of this paper we fix some constants c1 and c2 for which (4) holds. Similarly to the notation for opt, we will also sometimes denote specLB(A) = maxn specLB(A, n). For the proofs presented in this abstract, we will solely use the above spectral lower bound. For the other results, we also need to develop a more sophisticated lower bound by extending the work of Lovász, Spencer, and Vesztergombi [41] and use it together with the volume lower bound developed in [5, 32] . We refer to the full version [45] for the details.
A BASE DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
The mechanisms in our paper rely crucially on a base decomposition algorithm based on the minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid of the columns of the query matrix A. Given a matrix A ∈ R d×N , the base decomposition algorithm (Algorithm 1) computes a set of orthonormal matrices U1, . . . , U k , where k ≤ 1+log d . For each i = j, U T i Uj = 0, and the union of the columns of U1, . . . , U k forms an orthonormal basis for R d . Thus, Algorithm 1 computes a basis for R d , and partitions ("decomposes") it into k = O(log d) bases of mutually orthogonal subspaces. The decomposition allows us to use a basic (Gaussian or K-norm) mechanism in one subspace and match its error by a lower bound for the rest of orthogonal subspaces.
The next lemma captures the technical property of the decomposition of Algorithm 1 that allows us to prove matching upper and lower error bounds for our dense and sparse case algorithms. 
Algorithm 1 BASE DECOMPOSITION
PROOF. Let us, for ease of notation, assume that d is a power of 2. We prove that there exists a set S, . For the rest of the proof we assume that F is diagonal.
Since F is diagonal, ui is equal to ei, the i-th standard basis vector. Therefore U1 is diagonal and equal to the projection onto e d/2+1 , . . . , e d , and V is also diagonal and equal to the projection onto e1, .
(recall that we assumed that rankA = d and therefore F is non-singular). Since the minimum enclosing ellipsoid of K is E = F B . We chose F , and therefore F −1 , as well as T to be diagonal matrices, so they all commute. Then, since T is a projection matrix,
Observe that, since K ⊆ E, we have
Therefore, max (6) completes the proof.
For the presentation convenience, the above decomposition has been based on the exact minimum enclosing ellipsoid. Actually, a sufficiently approximate MEE is enough for our purpose.
ALGORITHMS FOR APPROXIMATE PRI-VACY
In this section we present our main results: efficient nearly optimal algorithms for approximate privacy in the cases of dense databases (n > d/ε) and sparse databases (n = o(d/ε) ). Both algorithms rely on the base decomposition algorithm above.
The Dense Case: Correlated Gaussian Noise
Our first result is an efficient algorithm whose expected error matches the spectral lower bound specLB up to polylogarithmic factors and is therefore nearly optimal. This proves Theorem 1. The algorithm adds correlated unbiased Gaussian noise to the exact answer Ax. The noise distribution is computed based on the decomposition algorithm of the previous subsection.
Algorithm 2 GAUSSIAN NOISE MECHANISM
. . , U k be base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A, where Ui is an orthonormal basis for a space of dimension di; 
Notice that even though we assume rankA = d, this is without loss of generality: if rankA = r < d, we can compute an orthonormal basis V for the range of A and apply the algorithm to A = V T A to compute an approximationz to A x. We have We start the proof of Theorem 12 with the privacy analysis. For ease of notation, we assume throughout the analysis that d is a power of 2.
PROOF. The lemma follows from Corollary 10. Next we describe in detail why the corollary applies.
Let U1, . . . , U k be the base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A. Let Vi be the subspace spanned by the columns of Ui and let di be the dimension of Vi. The projection matrix onto Vi is UiU T i . Let Ei be the ellipsoid Ui(riB 
By (7), it is enough to lower bound opt ε,δ (A) by Ω(
. As a first step we lower bound specLB(A). Then the lower bound on opt ε,δ will follow from (4) and Lemma 3.
To lower bound specLB(A), we invoke Lemma 5. It follows from the lemma that for every i there exists a projection matrix Πi = WiW 
Finally, by Lemma 3, there exists a small enough δ = δ(ε), for which opt ε,δ (A,
, and this completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 12:
The proof of the theorem follows from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. The privacy guarantee is direct from Lemma 6. Next we prove that the error of Mg is near optimal.
Let w be the noise vector generated by Algorithm 2 so that w = √ k
We proceed to upper bound this quantity in terms of opt ε,δ (A).
By Lemma 7, for each wi, E riUiwi 
This completes the proof.
The Sparse Case: Least Squares Estimation
In this subsection we present an algorithm with stronger accuracy guarantees than Algorithm 2: it is optimal for any query matrix A and any database size bound n (Theorem 3). The algorithm combines the noise distribution of Algorithm 2 with a least squares estimation step. Privacy is guaranteed by noise addition, while the least squares estimation step reduces the error significantly when n = o(d/ε). The algorithm is shown as Algorithm 3. 
. . , U k be base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A, where Ui is an orthonormal basis for a space of dimension di; Let t be the largest integer such that dt ≥ εn;
PROOF. The output of M (A, x, n) is a deterministic function of the output of Mg (A, x) . By Lemma 6, Mg(A, x) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and, therefore, by Lemma 2 (i.e. the post-processing property of differential privacy), M (A, x, n) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy. To finish the proof of the lemma, we need to lower bound opt ε,δ (A, n) by Ω( Using Lemmas 8 and 9, along with ideas from the dense case, we complete the proof of Theorem 13 in the appendix We remark that the mechanisms presented here can be easily implemented in time Nd O(1) . The computation of an approximate MEE and approximate least squares can both be done using the Frank-Wolfe algorithm [24] . A nice feature of our mechanisms is that using heuristics that do not give any guarantees only affects the accuracy; the privacy holds as long as the ellipsoid used is a containing ellipsoid, and we sample noise accurately from the Gaussian. We discuss these issues in more detail in the full version.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented near optimal mechanisms for any linear query for dense and sparse databases, under both pure and approximate differential privacy. Our mechanisms are simple and efficient, and it would be instructive to implement them so as to compare them with existing techniques.
Our work uses the hereditary discrepancy lower bound, which holds for small enough constant ε and δ. Since our lower bounds do not get higher as δ gets smaller, the approximation ratio has an O( log 1/δ) term in it. We leave open the question of developing better lower bounding techniques, and better approximation ratios for (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Our work gives 2 2 bounds on the error. While we can translate those bounds to ∞ error bounds for the dense case, we leave open the question of designing near optimal ∞ error mechanisms in the sparse case. Finally, our mechanisms in the sparse case have error which is within polylog(d, N ) of the optimal. Since N can be potentially exponential in the size of the input, a natural question is to try to remove, or improve the dependence on N .
